VAN DEREN, J.
¶ 1 Lawrence and Shelane L'Hommedieu
¶ 2 On March 26, 2003, the Lanes petitioned for review under LUPA, seeking, in part, to enforce a restrictive covenant and to permanently enjoin the L'Hommedieus from installing an additional septic system while constructing a second house on their property.
¶ 3 The Lanes appealed the trial court's decision granting partial summary judgment to the L'Hommedieus and quashing the preliminary injunction and, in our unpublished 2005 opinion, we reversed and remanded to the trial court because material issues of fact existed. Lane v. Skamania County, noted at 128 Wn.App. 1063, 2005 WL 1847180, at *8. After remand, on June 14, 2006, the Lanes filed a lis pendens against the L'Hommedieus' property. At a bench trial, the L'Hommedieus argued that they were entitled to damages and attorney fees because the Lanes wrongfully enjoined the installation of the septic system. But they did not claim that they were entitled to damages or attorney fees based on a wrongfully filed lis pendens.
¶ 4 After a bench trial concluded on February 28, 2007, the trial court generally made factual findings mitigating enforcement of the covenant against the L'Hommedieus. It also found that the Lanes had not brought their suit in "bad faith" and that the L'Hommedieus had not suffered "substantial damages" from the preliminary injunction. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 370. It concluded that the covenant did not apply to the L'Hommedieus' property and septic system and denied the Lanes' request for a permanent injunction. But it also concluded that the Lanes wrongfully enjoined the L'Hommedieus and awarded the L'Hommedieus' attorney fees "incurred in quashing the preliminary injunction." CP at 371. It entered judgment on May 31, 2007.
¶ 6 We issued a mandate in the second appeal on January 12, 2010. On January 21, the L'Hommedieus moved in the trial court under CR 13(e) to supplement their pleadings to assert a counterclaim alleging that (1) in June 2006, they had listed their home for sale with a real estate agent; (2) under Washington law, an action seeking to enforce a covenant is not an action affecting title to real property; (3) they were entitled to damages arising from the Lanes' wrongful filing of a lis pendens against their property in 2006;
¶ 7 In denying the L'Hommedieus' motion, the trial court orally ruled that the L'Hommedieus' motion arose under CR 13(f) and that they failed to demonstrate "any oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect" in failing to file their counterclaim "as soon as the lis pendens was filed [or] shortly thereafter." Report of Proceedings at 15. The L'Hommedieus unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration. They now appeal.
¶ 8 The L'Hommedieus argue that the trial court erred in relying on CR 13(f) to deny leave to plead their lis pendens counterclaim because their counterclaim arose after they filed their answer and, thus, CR 13(e) applied. The Lanes contend that the trial court correctly denied leave to assert the counterclaim under either rule. We agree that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the L'Hommedieus motion to amend their pleadings.
¶ 9 We review the trial court's grant or denial of leave to amend or supplement the pleadings for abuse of discretion. Wilson v. Horsley, 137 Wn.2d 500, 505, 974 P.2d 316 (1999); Herron v. Tribune Publ'g Co., Inc., 108 Wn.2d 162, 169, 736 P.2d 249 (1987). "A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision `is manifestly unreasonable or based upon untenable grounds or reasons.'" Salas v. Hi-Tech Erectors, 168 Wn.2d 664, 668-69, 230 P.3d 583 (2010) (quoting State v. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668, 701, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997)).
¶ 10 We review the interpretation of court rules, a matter of law, de novo. Burt v. Dep't of Corr., 168 Wn.2d 828, 832, 231 P.3d 191 (2010). We apply the same principles when interpreting court rules that we apply when we interpret statutes. State v. Carson, 128 Wn.2d 805, 812, 912 P.2d 1016 (1996). When words in a court rule are plain and unambiguous, further statutory construction is not necessary and we apply the court rule as written. State v. Robinson, 153 Wn.2d 689, 693, 107 P.3d 90 (2005).
¶ 11 CR 13(e) provides:
(Boldface omitted.) CR 13(f) provides:
(Boldface omitted.)
¶ 12 The L'Hommedieus based their counterclaim on the lis pendens filed by the Lanes. The L'Hommedieus filed their answer
¶ 13 But an appellate court may affirm a trial court's correct result on any grounds established by the pleadings and supported by the record. LaMon v. Butler, 112 Wn.2d 193, 200-01, 770 P.2d 1027 (1989). The L'Hommedieus argue that they timely moved to supplement their pleadings because, reading CR 13(e) and RCW 4.28.328(3) together, their lis pendens counterclaim did not mature until they became the prevailing party in the Lanes' action. We disagree.
¶ 14 We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). Our fundamental objective in statutory interpretation is to give effect to the legislature's intent. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 9, 43 P.3d 4. If a statute's meaning is plain on its face, then we give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent. State ex rel. Citizens Against Tolls (CAT) v. Murphy, 151 Wn.2d 226, 242, 88 P.3d 375 (2004). We discern plain meaning not only from the provision in question but also from closely related statutes and the underlying legislative purposes. Murphy, 151 Wash.2d at 242, 88 P.3d 375.
¶ 15 RCW 4.28.328(3), upon which the L'Hommedieus rely as a basis for their counterclaim, provides:
But the statute does not govern when a counterclaim under RCW 4.28.328(3) must be filed.
¶ 16 CR 13 sets forth the rules for asserting counterclaims. Washington cases discussing CR 13(e) are sparse, and interpretation of when a counterclaim matures under CR 13(e) is an issue of first impression in this state. But Division One of this court has discussed when a claim has "matured" under CR 13(a), which governs compulsory counterclaims. Chew v. Lord, 143 Wn.App. 807, 814-816, 181 P.3d 25 (2008). In Chew, Lord sued Chew and the corporate owner of an abandoned mine in Nevada for injuries sustained during an adult scavenger hunt that Chew had organized in the mine. 143 Wash. App. at 809, 181 P.3d 25. Chew and the mine's corporate owner asserted cross claims against each other. Chew, 143 Wash.App. at 810, 181 P.3d 25. After losing a summary judgment motion in the Nevada action, Chew filed suit in Washington against Lord, claiming Lord breached the indemnification clause in the waiver Lord had signed before the scavenger hunt began. Chew, 143 Wash. App. at 811, 181 P.3d 25. Specifically, Chew sought a judgment declaring that the waiver required Lord to hold him harmless for claims arising from the scavenger hunt and to indemnify him for any money spent and any judgment entered against him in defending the Nevada action. Chew, 143 Wash. App. at 811, 181 P.3d 25. The Washington trial court dismissed Chew's claims as compulsory counterclaims that he should have brought in the Nevada action. Chew, 143 Wash.App. at 812, 181 P.3d 25.
¶ 17 On appeal, Chew argued that his indemnity claim against Lord would not have matured until after the Nevada action's final resolution and, thus, was not a compulsory counterclaim. Chew, 143 Wash.App. at 812, 815-16, 181 P.3d 25. Division One disagreed.
Chew, 143 Wash.App. at 814-15, 181 P.3d 25 (emphases and alteration in original) (quoting 6 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1411, at 81-84 (2d ed. 1990)). It reasoned that Chew's indemnification claims against Lord were mature when Chew served his answer in the Nevada action because, "[a]t that time, [Chew] had already incurred legal costs associated with defending the Nevada action." Chew, 143 Wash. App. at 816, 181 P.3d 25. It further reasoned:
Chew, 143 Wash.App. at 816, 181 P.3d 25. Thus, it held that the trial court properly dismissed Chew's claims as mature compulsory counterclaims that he should have pleaded in his answer in the Nevada action. Chew, 143 Wash.App. at 816, 181 P.3d 25.
¶ 18 The relevant inquiry under both CR 13(a) and CR 13(e) is whether the later-asserted counterclaim matured before or after the answer was filed. Thus, Chew's CR 13(a) maturation analysis is helpful when analyzing a later-filed claim under CR 13(e). Further, we may look to federal cases interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 13(e) as persuasive authority because it is substantially similar to Washington's CR 13(e).
¶ 19 The L'Hommedieus correctly observe that RCW 4.28.328(3) entitles only an "aggrieved party who prevails in defense of the action in which the lis pendens was filed" to actual damages and reasonable attorney fees and costs. But the L'Hommedieus based their counterclaim on the Lanes' lis pendens filing after the L'Hommedieus listed their home for sale. Any damages they incurred from the lis pendens began accruing when the Lanes filed it. Likewise, the L'Hommedieus had already incurred costs and attorney fees in defending "the action in which the lis pendens was filed," i.e., the Lanes' action to enforce the covenant against the L'Hommedieus, long before they moved to assert their counterclaim. RCW 4.28.328(3). Finally, the L'Hommedieus claimed in part that the Lanes lacked substantial justification for filing the lis pendens because under Washington law an action to enforce a covenant is not an action affecting title to real property. If the L'Hommedieus' claims were true, they were true when the Lanes filed the lis pendens in 2006.
¶ 20 The bases of the L'Hommedieus' counterclaim came into existence in 2006 (or shortly thereafter), when the Lanes filed the lis pendens and were not dependent on the outcome of the main action tried after remand from this court in 2005. As in Chew, only the L'Hommedieus' right to recover on their counterclaim, i.e., their status as the prevailing party, awaited the main action's outcome. Thus, the L'Hommedieus' counterclaim matured in 2006 when the Lanes filed the lis pendens or shortly thereafter, well before the trial in 2007 and well before they moved to assert it after the 2007 trial, the entry of judgment, and this court's mandate in 2010. The claim that their counterclaim did not mature until after our mandate issued in 2010 fails.
¶ 21 CR 13(e) permits the assertion of after-arising counterclaims "by supplemental pleading." CR 15(d) provides:
(Boldface omitted.)
¶ 22 Our Supreme Court has observed that prejudice to the opposing party is grounds for denial of leave to supplement pleadings under CR 15(d). Herron, 108 Wash.2d at 169, 736 P.2d 249. Undue delay and unfair surprise are factors we may consider in determining prejudice. Herron, 108 Wash.2d at 165-66, 736 P.2d 249. Here, allowing the L'Hommedieus to revive this action by asserting their counterclaim more than three years after it matured, more than three years after trial and entry of judgment, and after our mandate terminating review in 2010 unquestionably constitutes undue delay and unfair surprise and, thus, undue prejudice to the Lanes. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 2010 when it denied the L'Hommedieus leave to supplement their pleadings to assert a claim that arose and matured in 2006.
¶ 23 We affirm.
We concur: HUNT and JOHANSON, JJ.
(Boldface omitted.)
